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Pluralism by the Rules: Conflict and Cooperation in Environmental Regulation

Weber, Edward P.

9780878406722 - Pluralism by the Rules: Conflict and Cooperation in Environmental Regulation
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Article description

Despite Americas pluralistic, fragmented, and generally adversarial political culture, participants in pollution control politics have begun to collaborate to reduce the high costs of developing, implementing, and enforcing regulations. Edward P. Weber uses examples from this traditionally combative policy arena to propose a new model for regulation, pluralism by the rules, a structured collaborative format that can achieve more effective results at lower costs than typically come from antagonistic approaches. Weber cites the complexity and high implementation costs of environmental policy as strong but insufficient incentives for collaboration. He shows that cooperation becomes possible when opposing sides agree to follow specific rules that include formal binding agreements about enforcement, commitment to the process by political and bureaucratic leaders, and the ensured access and accountability of all parties involved. Such rules establish trust, create assurances that agreements will be enforced, and reduce the perceived risks of collaboration.

Specifications

Author Weber, Edward P.
ISBN/EAN 9780878406722
Can't be ordered

Article description

Despite Americas pluralistic, fragmented, and generally adversarial political culture, participants in pollution control politics have begun to collaborate to reduce the high costs of developing, implementing, and enforcing regulations. Edward P. Weber uses examples from this traditionally combative policy arena to propose a new model for regulation, pluralism by the rules, a structured collaborative format that can achieve more effective results at lower costs than typically come from antagonistic approaches. Weber cites the complexity and high implementation costs of environmental policy as strong but insufficient incentives for collaboration. He shows that cooperation becomes possible when opposing sides agree to follow specific rules that include formal binding agreements about enforcement, commitment to the process by political and bureaucratic leaders, and the ensured access and accountability of all parties involved. Such rules establish trust, create assurances that agreements will be enforced, and reduce the perceived risks of collaboration.

Specifications

Author Weber, Edward P.
ISBN/EAN 9780878406722